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ABSTRACT
Application markets have revolutionized the software download
model of mobile phones: third-party application developers of-
fer software on the market that users can effortlessly install on
their phones. This great step forward, however, also imposes some
threats to user privacy: applications often ask for permissions that
reveal private information such as the user’s location, contacts and
messages. While some mechanisms to prevent leaks of user pri-
vacy to applications have been proposed by the research commu-
nity, these solutions fail to consider that application markets are
primarily driven by advertisements that rely on accurately profiling
the user. In this paper we take into account that there are two par-
ties with conflicting interests: the user, interested in maintaining
their privacy and the developer who would like to maximize their
advertisement revenue through user profiling. We have conducted
an extensive analysis of more than 250,000 applications in the An-
droid market. Our results indicate that the current privacy protec-
tion mechanisms are not effective as developers and advert com-
panies are not deterred. Therefore, we designed and implemented
a market-aware privacy protection framework that aims to achieve
an equilibrium between the developer’s revenue and the user’s pri-
vacy. The proposed framework is based on the establishment of a
feedback control loop that adjusts the level of privacy protection on
mobile phones, in response to advertisement generated revenue.
1. INTRODUCTION
Mobile phones have become a ubiquitous piece of technology
that is carried by virtually every individual throughout their daily
life. The improved capabilities of smart phones (computation, sens-
ing and communication) have transformed them into avatars of the
individual in the digital world. Indeed, smart phones are gate keep-
ers of one’s mobility patterns, contact details of friends, social net-
works, etc. The combined information that can be accessed through
a smart phone is vast, rich in detail, and covers a variety of the
owner’s personal life. At the same time, the proliferation of smart
phones can be largely attributed to their ability to host a range of
third-party applications that can be downloaded and installed by the
user. Allowing third-party applications to operate within a device
holding private information about their owner can lead to unantic-
ipated privacy and security risks: according to [10], malicious An-
droid applications have grown 5 times from January 2011 to July
2011. The literature includes a variety of recommended solutions
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for privacy protection: delivering mock information to the applica-
tion [2, 12] or hiding details using differential privacy [14].
While the issues around privacy are becoming more evident over
time, we also see a booming market of mobile phone applications
that, to a significant extent, are free. In July 2011 Google an-
nounced that there are more than 250,000 applications (up from
5,000 applications less than two years ago) in the Android market
that were downloaded more than 8 billion times by more than 100
million Android devices [13]. The mobile advertising industry is
an integral part of this market, as it offers the financial incentives
for developers to distribute free applications. However, the success
of the advertising industry is interlinked with the accurate profiling
of users who are the recipients of targeted advertisement [6]. This
means that a successful advertisement campaign requires access to
personal information that can potentially be considered private.
Although existing solutions to mobile phone privacy can offer
some level of protection to the user [2, 12], they fail to consider the
implications for a market that is primarily driven by the accurate
profiling of user behavior. Indeed, any solution with the potential
of being realistically effective needs to consider that user data gen-
erates the revenue that pays for “free stuff”. In this work we present
a new perspective on the mobile phone privacy problem by consid-
ering the implications of a solution for the current business model
that drives the free application market. An analysis of the Android
application market reveals that the abundance of free applications
is likely to be attributed to the failure of the existing privacy pro-
tection mechanisms available on the smart phone platforms. By
analyzing the current business model in mobile application adver-
tisement, we show that a wide adoption of more rigorous privacy
protection mechanisms can potentially lead to the collapse of the
ad-driven mobile application market. We then present our efforts
towards a realistic solution to a market-aware privacy protection
framework. Our approach is based on the establishment of a feed-
back control loop that adjusts the level of privacy protection on
mobile phones, in response to advertisement generated revenue.
2. MARKET ANALYSIS
The smart phone industry has employed a range of mechanisms
to address the risks involved with the installation of third-party ap-
plications on mobile phones. The two leading smart phone operat-
ing systems follow different approaches. In Apple’s iOS, all new
applications are required to undergo Apple’s closed approval pro-
cess before being released to the market. In this model Apple acts
as a trusted party that gives a one-off certificate that the application
can use to retrieve information from a mobile phone. After an iOS
application is released, no information is offered about the types
of data the application has access to (with the exception of loca-
tion data where user access control is allowed). Android avoids the
need for a trusted party by allowing the privacy negotiation to take
















































































(b) Average Rating (Histogram)
Figure 1: Application popularity.
application is required to explicitly specify its permission require-
ments. During installation the user is presented with a grouped
list of permissions that the application requires to run. Such per-
missions include access to accurate or coarse grained location, the
phone’s state, access to the phone’s address book, to name a few.
The assumption is that based on the requested permission list, the
users can make an informed decision about whether they want to
install the application or not. Effectively, the Android permission
model involves a one-off control point (installation) after which the
application has full access to the requested resources.
In order to understand the impact that the existing permission
model has on the mobile application landscape, we explored the
ecosystem of the Android application market. We investigated the
picture of the Android Market by analyzing the metadata of all the
applications available on the online market. The market crawl was
performed through a Java-based tool during July 2011. Using 64
Google accounts and a combination of targeted search queries, we
were able to capture the whole market over a six week crawling pe-
riod. The collected data include the full set of metadata for 251,342
applications1. The metadata include, amongst other information,
the application title, type, category, number of downloads, average
rating, and the full list of requested permissions.
The complete market consists of 73% free applications. In al-
most all of the application categories the high ratio of free vs paid
applications is evident. The exceptions are categories that may in-
clude copyrighted content such as the “Personalization" category
(26% free) with a large number of wallpaper applications, and the
“Books & References" category (53% free). A comparison be-
tween free and paid applications shows somewhat expected results:
free applications are significantly more popular than paid ones (Fig-
ure 1(a)), with 20% of free applications downloaded more than
10,000 times, in contrast to only 0.2% of paid. At the same time
paid applications receive higher user ratings (Figure 1(b)).
The high popularity of free applications offers an indication of
the possible monetization opportunity through advertisement. In
order to explore any possible trend we manually inspected the 50
most popular free applications in the market. Of those 50, 11 ap-
plications do not use advertisements, 32 applications use advertise-
ments through add-on widgets and 7 applications show advertise-
ments integrated with the application. Overall, 77% of the top free
applications were ad-supported.
Higher advertisement revenues are typically achieved through
targeted advertisements. As a consequence, better profiling of the
target user requires access to more personal information about the
owner of the device. We explore such trends in the Android market
by inspecting the access permissions requested by free applications.
Figure 2(a) shows the distribution of permissions requested by the
Android applications. Surprisingly, 40% of the paid and 10% of
the free applications do not require any permission to run. Most
1According to the official Google blog at August 2011 there were


































































































(b) Number of permissions for the
top/bottom 5 categories.















































































(b) Dangerous permission groups
Figure 3: % of apps requesting at least one permission in a category.
of these applications are themes, comics, games, and development
libraries (Figure 2(b)). Furthermore, 7% of the free applications
request more than 10 permissions compared to only 1.8% of paid
ones. Our results indicate that, on average, free applications usu-
ally request 2-3 additional permissions compared to paid applica-
tions of the same category. It is interesting to note that incorporat-
ing targeted advertisement offered by a popular Ad-network such
as AdMob would require permissions for Internet access, location,
and device identification, leading to 3 additional permissions for an
application that does not require them by default.
The Android OS organizes permissions into different threat lev-
els: normal permissions are considered of minimal risk and include
access to normal functionality, e.g. access to the vibrator, reading
the battery level. Dangerous permissions are considered of high
risk and could pose a threat to the user’s privacy. Such permissions
include access to location and access to SMS content. When an ap-
plication requests a dangerous permission, a warning is displayed
during installation to alert the user of the potential risks. The user is
expected to make a binary decision on whether to install that appli-
cation or not. Finally, there are signed or system permissions that
are not presented at all to the user. The analysis on the market data
shows that the majority of applications request at least one danger-
ous permission (Figure 3(a)). Furthermore, if we consider the dif-
ference between paid and free applications, it seems that free ap-
plications mostly request additional dangerous permissions: 73%
of free applications request at least one dangerous permission com-
pared to just 41% of paid ones. According to this trend, 7 out of 10
free applications would show a warning to the user during instal-
lation. It is well established that such types of frequent warnings
render them completely ineffective, as users tend to keep acknowl-
edging them without much consideration [15]. This could imply
that applications can request highly sensitive information unchal-
lenged by the end users, thus defeating the purpose of Android’s
permission model. For instance, the frequency of such warnings
might distract the users from noticing that 7% of the applications





























































































































(b) # of downloads vs # of permissions.
Figure 4: Permissions and popularity.
In Figure 5(b) we show the percentage of applications that re-
quest at least one permission that could reveal personal informa-
tion. This includes applications that ask for access to read mes-
sages, accounts, phone calls, the user’s contacts, phone state (pro-
vider, phone number, IMEI, etc), etc. Surprisingly, games seem to
frequently request these permissions (e.g., more than 60% of free
racing games), followed by social and multimedia applications. On
average, an alarming portion of applications (30%) request at least
one of these permissions. Again, we observe that free applications
are more likely to request such information. We should note here
that more than 94% of these applications also request network ac-
cess and, therefore, could potentially leak this information.
In Figure 5(a) we consider the statistics for location information.
While the top categories are somewhat expected (“travel & local”,
“transportation”, “social” and “weather”), we can also see amongst
the top ranking categories “comics", “games" and “finance". Fur-
thermore, paid applications in the same categories do not demon-
strate the same trend. For instance, only 1% of the paid “comics”
require location compared to 33% of the free versions. The same
pattern occurs for other applications such as books, personalization,
medical education, and for games. We deduce that a high percent-
age of free applications request location access that is not justified
for their particular application category. To examine the extent to
which access to location is unrelated to the service offered by free
applications we analyzed the descriptions of all applications that
request access to location. A text filter was used that matched the
presence of 22 key phrases that are associated with location based
services (e.g. location, navigate, local, GPS, nearby). Although
the filter was not intended to be exhaustive, the comparative results
between paid and free applications are revealing. 62% of the paid
applications requesting location include one of these keywords in
their description, compared to only 32% of the free ones.
Finally, we examined whether the permission model followed by
Android is able to put pressure on developers to avoid requesting
unnecessary permissions by making the users reluctant to install
applications that ask for risky permissions. We explored the mar-
ket to find any information that could indicate that such a relation
exists. A comparison between the popularity of applications and
the number of permissions they request showed that there was no
correlation between the two. Figure 4(b) shows that there is ac-
tually a slightly higher number of permissions on average for the
most popular applications, although the high variability does not
allow us to make any definite claims.
In summary, our analysis shows that the Android Market is mostly
composed of highly popular free applications. As free applications
are primarily supported by advertisements, this further indicates
that the whole ecosystem depends on this revenue model. Further-
more, our results show that the current permission-based mecha-
nism fails to deter developers as free applications request signifi-
cantly more permissions and there is no correlation between pop-
ularity of an application and the amount of sensitive information






























































































































































































(b) Other private information.
Figure 5: % of apps requesting sensitive information.
ing model that may distract the users. Finally, as our results indicate
that free applications request significantly more private permissions
than paid applications, it is important to examine how the current
mobile advertisement model works.
3. MOBILE ADVERTISEMENT MODEL
The mobile advertising business model is the primary mecha-
nism that funds the exploding market of mobile phone applications.
We investigate this business model, through an experimental anal-
ysis of a popular ad-network (AdMob). In its generic form the
model involves three main parties: the user who is the recipient
of a service delivered by a mobile application; the developer who
expects to be rewarded/compensated for delivering the service; and
the ad-network that compensates the developer in exchange for the
successful gathering of user interest in businesses through targeted
adverts. AdMob pays a developer according to the number of im-
pressions a certain advert has on his mobile application, with signif-
icantly more funds offered when an impression generates a “click”
from the user. The actual price that is offered depends on the de-
mand of different companies to advertise on a particular slot.
In this model the ad-network has a strong incentive to generate
as many clicks per impression as possible for its adverts in order to
satisfy their clients and to minimize the cost of unsuccessful adver-
tisement impressions that should be paid to developers. This means
that the ad-network should target users that are most likely to find
them useful. Advertising networks are generally secretive about the
profiling algorithms employed for targeted advertisement. How-
ever, it is understood that demographic information (gender, age),
location, online behavior, and social networks are some of the infor-
mation used in such algorithms. Moreover, with the advent of ubiq-
uitous computing, the user’s whereabouts are extensively used to
display location-based advertisements [11]. It is then clear that an
advertising network has strong incentives to collect as much infor-
mation as possible about a user. However, in typical in-application
advertisement frameworks, this collection of profile information is
delegated to the target application that is then responsible for feed-
ing it to the ad-network (Figure 6(a)). Therefore, the current model
relies on the fact that developers have a strong incentive to support
the accurate profiling of the user, as this can increase their revenue.
However, the tight coupling of the ad-support widget with the
application means that permissions that are required to support tar-
geted advertisement are publicized as application permissions, me-
rely to allow the passing of private information to the ad-network
(Figure 6(a)). The end result is a market where the privacy re-
quirements of the application rarely reflect the actual needs of the
service that is delivered. This model disrupts the trust expectations
of the user by obscuring who might access its information, and how
that information might be used. Our market analysis indicates that
this disruption leads to a general disregard of the permission con-
trol mechanism by the user. The current permissions model does
not seem to impose any significant pressure on developers to limit
the number of permissions they request for their applications. In
essence the existing model is pushing the market for an uncontrol-
lable collection of as much personal information as possible, with-
out any indication of a force governing this.
4. PRIVACY PROTECTION
Acknowledging the problem of privacy preservation in mobile
phones, a number of approaches attempt to limit the flow of pri-
vate information towards third party applications. MockDroid [2],
and Apex [12], for example, are systems advocating the blocking
of the flow, with the delivery of false information to certain ap-
plications, while [14] considers location privacy with the addition
of noise to the delivered information. In the general form, most
solutions attempt to limit the flow of private information to the ap-
plication, without however acknowledging that part of that flow is
used for the profiling of the user for targeted advertisement. In-
deed, such techniques do not blend well with the ecosystem of the
ad-supported mobile application market. The tight coupling of ac-
cess to private information and ad-supported revenue means that
privacy control could have grave consequences for the free appli-
cation market. Allowing individuals to withhold as much private
information as they want, will lead to a starvation of the profiling
stream and, consequently, a diminishment of the revenue stream
for the developers of ad-supported applications. This would even-
tually lead to an unsustainable free application market. This partic-
ular scenario can be considered a specific case of the “tragedy of
the commons" [7] where individuals acting selfishly will deplete a
shared resource when it is clear that it is not in anyone’s long-term
interest for this to happen. Any viable solution to the privacy prob-
lem, should aim for a system achieving some sort of equilibrium,
where the flow of private information is enough to sustain the flow
of service delivered to the users. In the following paragraphs we
identify key design strategies that can lead to a sustainable solution
for privacy control in an ad-supported mobile application market.
Decoupled Model: Our proposed framework for market-aware
privacy control is based on decoupling privacy control between the
application and the advertisement support component (i.e., to re-
place the model shown at Figure 6(a) with the model shown in Fig-
ure 6(b)) where two separate flows of information are allowed: one
towards the application/developer and one towards the ad-networks.
The decoupling allows the specification of distinct privacy require-
ments for the two entities. For the application, this allows the
specification of privacy requirements that are directly related to
the actual service offered by the application. For the ad-network
component, the distinct flow of private information can allow the
implementation of privacy control techniques specifically designed
to support an ad-driven market. This separation allows users to
commit to different sharing agreements between the two entities as
the information that is shared with advertisers could be subjected
to stricter privacy regulations similar to those that are enforced to
telecommunication providers, ISPs, banks, etc. Furthermore, this
separation restores the user’s trust expectations as it clarifies who
is the actual recipient of each different flow of private information.
The users can then more actively control the offered information
based on how much they trust each entity. This model requires two
internal mechanisms to work:
• Causal link between revenue and privacy: The decoupling of
application and ad-network leads to a clear three-party model,















(b) The envisaged model.
Figure 6: Mobile Advertisement Models.
network is responsible for the success rate of targeted advertise-
ment and therefore the revenue flow to the developer, who, as a
result, provides the service (the clockwise cycle shown at Fig-
ure 6(b)). In order to establish a mechanism that can potentially
achieve an equilibrium between revenue and privacy, a channel
that creates a causal link between the revenue flow and the pri-
vate information flow needs to be devised. We discuss possible
such mechanisms in Section 4.1.
• Incentivizing Developers: Developers might be reluctant to adopt
a new advertising model when the current model allows them to
greedily collect as much information as possible without any ev-
ident impact on the popularity of their applications. Therefore,
putting in place mechanisms that prevent developers from col-
lecting unnecessary user data, could incentivize them to adopt
the split-flow model proposed. Within the split-flow model such
mechanisms can prevent developers from collecting unneces-
sary user data that are not used by the developed application.
Our proposal is that the market should be redesigned in a man-
ner that would enhance awareness and allow users to impose
peer-pressure on developers in order to separate their revenue
flow and request less permissions for operation purposes. These
mechanisms will not only encourage developers to adopt the
new model, they will also be used in the newer model to discour-
age developers from requesting unnecessary permissions (i.e.,
control the information flow between users and developers in
Figure 6(b)). We analyze such solutions in Section 4.2.
4.1 Market-aware Privacy control
The main challenge in building a market-aware privacy control
framework is to establish a causal link between the flow of private
information that is delivered to an ad-network and the flow of rev-
enue delivered to the developer. The decoupling of the application
and ad-network components allows us to individually manipulate
the flow of private information to the ad-network, without affecting
the service offered by the application. Controlling the private infor-
mation flow requires the presence of a privacy firewall between the
source of private information (the mobile OS) and the ad-network
component. Such a privacy firewall, provides a gradient of privacy
flow control states. We assume that the level of private information
that is given to an ad-service can depend on a range of variables,
such as information accuracy or timelines. In the case of location,
for example, different levels of privacy control can lead to more or
less frequent updates, with more or less accurate location informa-
tion. According to the analysis of the advertising market, the level
of detail of the private information that is given to an ad-network is
positively correlated to the possibility of a target advertisement to
generate a successful “click". Consequently, reducing the level of
detail given to the ad-network is deemed to cause a knock-on effect
on the number of successful clicks.
In order to avoid the starvation effect that can be caused by an
uncontrolled reduction of the flow of private information, it is nec-
essary to forbid users from directly controlling it. Instead, the flow
of private information should be linked with the resulting revenue.
The actual revenue that a developer generates through advertise-
ment is not publicly accessible. However, a measurement of the
number of advertisement “clicks" generated by an application is a
strong indicator of the revenue flow.
The proposed solution consists of a framework that allows the
aggregation and sharing of the number of generated “clicks" on
each ad-supported application. The shared information about the
level of success of targeted advertisement is then used to change the
flow of private information delivered to the ad-network. This cre-
ates two opposing forces: if the click-through ratio (and therefore
the revenue) of a given application is high, the users have the op-
portunity to limit the private information leaked to the ad-network.
If the private information flow is restricted too much, the drop on
revenue flow triggers an increase on the private information flow.
The design of the system consists of a dynamic monitoring com-
ponent operating on the mobile phone that measures the “click-
through" ratio for a given application. The collected measurements
are aggregated through a market-server. Similarly, the privacy con-
trol component synchronizes with the market-server, in order to
adjust the level of privacy flow for all users of the given applica-
tion. As the privacy control mechanism operates over the aggregate
click-through ratio, no private information about individuals needs
to be maintained by the market server. More details on how this
can be implemented can be found in Section 5.
The revenue threshold problem The proposed framework creates
a feedback control mechanism that maintains the flow of private in-
formation for a given ad-supported application. For an application
the revenue flow is dependent of the number of users that are run-
ning an application and the average click-through ratio triggered by
advertisements. One of the challenges in this mechanism is the es-
tablishment of a desired “click through" ratio considered acceptable
for an application. That ratio will govern the adaptive changes to
privacy flow control, increasing the flow when the click ratio is low
and vice versa. Different market strategies can be implemented,
ranging from a fixed click through ratio for all applications (allow-
ing popular applications to achieve higher revenues by the higher
number of users), or by constructing appropriate incentive driven
mechanics and allowing the developers to specify a “value" for their
application in the form of ad-supported revenue. In the latter case,
the ad-supported value can be set in a similar manner as the price
that developers set for paid applications. In such case users can
decide whether they would like to offer the requested information
(e.g., location, device ID) to support the requested ad-supported
revenue, to purchase the paid version or anything in-between. Fur-
thermore, incentive mechanisms such as those described in [8] can
be used to enhance user participation. The introduction of such
mechanics in the ad-supported applications would lead to new dy-
namics on the mobile application market.
4.2 Incentivising Developers
The introduction of a new advertisement framework bears the
major challenge of incentivizing current developers to adopt the
new model. As the market analysis reveals, the existing privacy
control mechanisms offer a fertile environment for an abusive ad-
supported market, with uncontrollable collection of private infor-
mation. The proposed framework for market-aware privacy con-
trol requires developers to adopt a novel advertising approach that
could potentially limit their revenue flow in order to balance access
to private information. Clearly, the proposed model is not likely
to be adopted unless some additional mechanisms are employed to
encourage developers to switch.
We therefore propose an approach which aids to limit the devel-
opers from setting arbitrary permissions by establishing a mecha-
nism to apply peer pressure on the developer community with re-
spect to the privacy requirements of their applications. Such mech-
anisms would apply significantly more pressure to the current in-
application advertisement model (Figure 6(a)) which expects devel-
opers to request more privileges than required by their applications
in order to support targeted advertisements. Our expectation is that
this would eventually pave the way for the adoption of a split-model
(Figure 6(b)), where their applications are judged independently of
the ad-support mechanics and the users have clearer expectations
about how their information is used. Furthermore, within the newly
proposed model such mechanisms are still crucial for incentivizing
developers against harvesting private user information for their own
use (the flow between users and developers in Figure 6(b)).
Our solution relies on two components:
• A privacy monitoring component that can track the private infor-
mation collected by any application operating in a mobile phone
(e.g., TaintDroid [3]). The purpose of the privacy awareness
component is to allow user to understand what information is
captured by any given application running on their phone.
• A privacy aware application market where users can vote on the
necessity of individual privacy requirements for certain applica-
tions. This will allow existing users to effectively flag suspicious
permissions that, according to their own criteria, are not neces-
sary for operational purposes. The crowdsourced information
on privacy requirements can be integrated with the installation
process of applications in order to produce meaningful warnings
about over-privilledged applications, possibly impacting the pop-
ularity of applications with unreasonable privacy requirements.
5. IMPLEMENTATION
We explored the feasibility of our ad-aware privacy control frame-
work by modifying the Android operating system. Our implemen-
tation is based on Cyanogen v2.3.4: a community supported variant
of Android OS that can be installed to a large variety of devices.
Separating Permissions for Advertisements:
The decoupling of application and advertising permissions was
achieved by separating the two functions into distinct binaries. We
implemented a generic advertising service that is installed sepa-
rately, requesting its own set of permissions such as location and
Internet access. The advertising service exports a new Intent2
in order to allow other applications to subscribe. Applications that
require the use of the advertising service need to request a user-
defined permission: ACCESS_ADVERTISEMENT_SERVICE.
Communication between the application and the advertising ser-
vice is performed through a client-side library that is compiled with
the target application. Through Android’s IPC, the application can
launch a widget that illustrates advertisements on top of their UI,
without the need to specify any permissions that are required for
targeted advertisement.
Real-Time Monitoring: The real-time monitoring is part of the
mechanism that controls the flow of private information between
the mobile device and both the running application and the adver-
tising service. The mechanism is implemented through a system
service that is part of the OS and is capable of intercepting all inter-
actions between two applications and between an application and
system services. To do this we modified various OS components
(e.g., the Binder and the ActivityManager services). This
service records access patterns to critical components such as at-
tempts to get the user’s location, SMS, phone number or device ID.
Furthermore, for the advertising service, the real-time monitoring
captures the number of times a user may “click" on an advertise-
ment, as well as the amount of time an advertisement is displayed.
This information is collected as part of the privacy-control loop
mechanism and is used to i) dynamically control how much infor-
mation is exposed and ii) increase user awareness.
Dynamically control exposed data: To control access to private
information we implemented a new system service. This service
can dynamically revoke a permission to an application, or intercept
and anonymize the return value of an ICC call, intent or content
2Android’s event-based interprocess communication mechanism.
provider. The service can independently block or anonymize infor-
mation depending on whether the information is requested by an
application or an advertising service as discussed in Section 4.
To obfuscate the user’s location information we modified An-
droid’s LocationService. For each application the user can
reveal the real location, a fuzzy location (e.g., a random location
within a given range from the real location) or return unknown lo-
cation. The amount of added noise can be automatically calculated
in order to maintain the revenue model. Moreover, as it has been
shown that people value location information differently based on
where they are [9], in our prototype the user can create location-
based rules to obfuscate location when in certain locations (e.g.,
hide the exact location when at home). Similarly, our prototype
can anonymize the user’s identity (IMEI, Phone Number, Contacts,
SMS etc) while protecting the developer’s revenue by providing a
consistent random response to an application.
Increasing awareness and exerting peer pressure: We are cur-
rently developing a website that will replicate the functionality of
the Android Market. We use the information that we crawled for
more than 250,000 applications. For a given application, the users
will have the opportunity to vote and comment on each of the re-
quested permissions. Furthermore, the developer will have the op-
portunity to write a short description (less than 160 characters)
about why this permission is required. Furthermore, we are de-
veloping an enhanced version of the installation manager that will
work in conjunction with the enhanced market. During installation
the user is be presented with a sorted list of permissions. The sort-
ing depends on the voting: permissions that other users flagged as
unreasonable will be displayed first. Finally, to display the real-
time data that we gather we implemented a simple graphical user
interface where a user is shown a list of all installed applications
and information about access patterns to sensitive data such as the
location, contacts, messages, device ID, IMEI number.
We soon plan to launch the real-time monitoring tool, the web-
site and the installer as we would like to invite users and developers
to participate in a large-scale user study that aims to better under-
stand the current permission model and to validate the effectiveness
of such solutions. However, we believe that such a model should
preferably become an integrated part of the existing ecosystem.
6. RELATEDWORK
As mentioned, a number of papers have studied the current sta-
tus of mobile phone applications permission access and many ap-
proaches have been devised to limit the access to users’ data. In [1]
the authors analyzed 1,100 Android applications in order to group
their permission patterns. Stowaway [4] analyzed the byte-code of
940 applications and found that about one-third of them are over-
privileged. Similar results were found in [5] and [16], where the
authors designed a tool that aids the developers in specifying a
minimum set of permissions. While we focused on the differences
between free and paid applications by examining more than 250
thousand applications, these works further support our findings that
application developers are not deterred by the current permission
model and they often request more permissions than necessary.
TaintDroid [3] is a framework able to track how sensitive data
could leak to the Internet. The authors used this system to monitor
the behavior of 30 popular Android applications and they showed
that 20 of these applications might misuse users’ private informa-
tion. TaintDroid also revealed that 15 of the 30 applications re-
ported the users’ locations to remote advertising servers while 7
applications collected the device ID, phone number and the SIM
card’s serial number and sent them to the developer. These results
reinforce our findings and provide another reason why a privacy
protecting framework is necessary.
Finally, Apex [12] is a framework that extends the Android per-
mission model by allowing users to selectively revoke a permission
or impose constraints on the usage of resources (e.g., number of
SMS) at install time. Similarly, MockDroid [2] allows users to pro-
vide fake data to an application. While these approaches are very
powerful in limiting user data leaks, they might damage the current
revenue model for free applications. Our approach is an alternative
which tries to keep this revenue model in mind while controlling
user information flow to developers and ad-network.
7. CONCLUSIONS
In this work we are presenting a new perspective on the problem
of privacy protection for mobile phones. By analyzing more than
250,000 applications of the Android market we identify the signif-
icance of targeted advertisement in the success of the free appli-
cation market for smart phones. Identifying the tight link between
access to private information about users and ad-supported appli-
cations, we illustrate that privacy protection solutions bear the risk
of breaking the current business model that offers financial support
to the developers. Our prototype solution aims to introduce a pri-
vacy control mechanism that is interlinked with the ad-supported
revenue delivered to free applications. By establishing a feedback
control loop, privacy control can be dynamically adjusted in order
to maintain an equilibrium between the flow of private information
and the generated advertisement revenue. Our intention is to release
our model as an alternative advertisement service and evaluate the
impact of this mechanism in the mobile application market.
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